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Suitable Work Under Unemployment
Compensation Statutes
The Unemployment Compensation Statutes were designed to
provide security for workers during periods of involuntary unem-
ployment. Involuntary is here used in the sense of industry's fail-
ure to provide jobs. This is evidenced by the presence in all the
statutes of the requirement that an employee in order to be eligible
for benefits be able to work and be available for work.
The question of availability, which is determined from a claim-
ant's application, is essentially one of degree; that is, has the appli-
cant restricted himself to such an extent as to render him unavail-
able? An individual must, of course, be able and willing to accept
some type of work, but what is the minimum in this regard? A
maxim often reiterated in this respect is to the effect that a claim-
ant must be attached to the labor market. "A labor market for an
individual exists when there is a market for the type of services
which he offers in the geographical area in which he offers them."',
Market, as here used, "... means only that the type of services
which an individual is offering is generally performed in the geo-
graphical area in which he is offering them."' 2 Thus, the criterion
of availability should be not whether an individual has a reasonable
opportunity of obtaining work in his restricted field, but whether
the services which he is willing to render are generally performed
in his area.
Assuming an applicant satisfies the availability requirement, he
becomes eligible to receive benefits until he has refused an offer of
suitable work. The offer, it should be noted, ..... must be a bona
fide attempt to secure the individual's services and not merely for
the purpose of bringing about a disqualification."
Like all other legislative pronouncements couched in general
terms, the "suitability" provision has acquired meaning only
through judicial and administrative interpretation. And as is to
be expected in such cases, a marked lack of uniformity has resulted
in the decisions as to what work is suitable.
In order to receive approval of the Federal Social Security
Board, a state statute must incorporate the labor standards provi-
sion which enjoins disqualification of any otherwise eligible indi-
vidual for refusal to accept work under any of three specified
1 Freeman, Able to Work and Available for Work, 55 YALE L. J. 123, 124
(1945).
2 Ibid.
3 Menard, Refusal of Suitable Work, 55 YALE L. J. 134, 136 (1945).
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conditions. 4 Since such approval is a condition precedent to a state's
participation in the federal fund, all the statutes comply in this
respect. The decisions also agree that in all instances an applicant
must be ready and willing to accept some type of work and that in
no case is he under a compulsion to accept any job that might be
offered. Between these two extremes, however, lies a broad field of
discretion in which courts and boards operate with what at times
appears to be a total disregard of the social aims at which the act
was directed.
Whether or not an employee has good cause for refusing any
work would seem logically to depend on whether the work is suit-
able as to him. The determination of the latter question, in turn,
necessarily involves the consideration of the applicant's personal
circumstances. But, too often, it seems, these are entirely ignored.
Especially is this attitude apparent in the cases of married
women with children who, because of family obligations, refuse
work on the night shifts. A South Carolina court denied benefits
when a woman refused to continue working on the third shift, such
refusal being due to the fact that a relative who had previously
cared for her two children during these hours was no longer avail-
able.* Many courts and boards deny benefits in similar situations.6
According to the more liberal view, night work for such persons is
deemed unsuitable.7
Considering the prevalence of married women in industry, it
would seem that the result reached in the latter line of decisions is
the more desirable from a social standpoint. If women with family
obligations must continue in industry, they should not be compelled
to do so at the expense of sacrificing the family home. The national
interest as well as solicitude for the individual dictates such a
policy.* If the motives of these women be so laudable, as most courts
readily admit, should not their refusals be construed as being for
good cause?
'49 STAT. 640 (1935), 26 USC §1603(a) (5) (1948) "... (A) If the
offered position is vacant due to strike . . .; (B) if the wages, hours, or other
conditions of the work offered are substantially less favorable to the individual
than those prevailing for similar work in the locality; (C) if as a condition
of being employed the individual would be required to join a company union
or to resign from or refrain from joining any bona fide labor organization."
Mills v. S.C. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 204 S.C. 37, 28
S.E. 2d 535 (1944).
0 Dinovellis v. Danaher, 12 Conn. Supp. 122 (1943); Ford Motor Co. v.
Appeal Board (In re Koski), 316 Mich. 468, 25 N.W. 2d 586 (1947); Ohio
Ref. Dec., 665-Ref-44, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., 1950.25 (1944).
112802 Calif. R, Ben. Ser., Vol. 11, No. 10 (1948); New York App. Bd.
Case No. 11,471-44, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., 8842.06 (1945).
'Altman and Lewis, Limited Availability for Shift Employment: A Ci-
terion of Eligibility for Unemployment Compensation, 28 MINN. L. REV. 387,
22 N.C. L. Rav. 189 (1944).
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Another reason for rejecting proffered employment is a lack
of transportation. The Ohio statute in this regard provides that a
refusal of work will not disqualify an applicant if "... the work is
at an unreasonable distance from his residence. .. ,,o "The Board
of Review has consistently held that 11/ hours is not an unreason-
able time to travel to work. Beyond that it is assumed in the ordi-
nary case to be unreasonable. . . .",0 Nor is the work suitable if
the cost of transportation to and from the place of employment
is unreasonable. Recently, a claimant's refusal was held justified
where she could not use public transportation to return home from
the factory at 1:45 A. M."
However, if an applicant resides outside of an industrial area,
he must supply his own transportation to an area where jobs are
available and the time needed for travel becomes immaterial.1 2 The
Supreme Court of Ohio had occasion to discuss such a situation in
two recent cases.13 In both instances, the claimants were residing
some distance from Toledo where they had established their employ-
ment credits. In the Leonard case, claimant stated she had trans-
portation to Toledo only between 8:30 A. M and 5:00 P. m. No
referral had been given. In the Kontner case, claimant refused
referrals to jobs in Toledo for the reason that she lacked adequate
transportation. The court allowing benefits in the former case and
denying them in the latter said, "If a person resides in a nonindus-
trial area and has no means of transportation to an industrial area,
he cannot be said to be in the labor market . ,,"4 Thus, a lack of
transportation does not render work unsuitable if the claimant
resides in a locality where there exists no reasonable opportunity
for work.
Union membership under the Ohio law 5 and that of most other
states does not justify a refusal of nonunion work even though
acceptance would subject the member to suspension or expulsion
from the union. 6 The syllabus of the Chambers case declares that
' OHIO GEN. CODE § 1345-6(e) (3) (1946).
"Ohio Ref. Dec., 1829-Ref-45, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., I1950.51 (1945).
' Ohio Bd. or Rev. Dec., 27-BR-49, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., %8222.05 (1949).
" Copeland v. E.S.C., 197 Okla. 429, 172 P. 2d 420 (1946).
Leonard v. Board, 148 Ohio St. 419, 75 N.E. 2d 567 (1947) ; Kontner v.
Board, 148 Ohio St. 614, 76 N.E. 2d 611 (1947).
"Kontner v. Board, supra note 13 at 620, 76 N.E. 2d at 615.
"OHIO GEN. CODE §1345-6 (e) (1). A refusal to accept work shall not dis-
qualify if "As a condition of being so employed, he would be required to join
a company union, or to resign from or refrain from joining any bona fide
labor organization, or would be denied the right to retain membership in and
observe the lawful rules of any such organization."
1 Chambers v. Owens-Ames-Kimball Co., 146 Ohio St. 559, 67 N.E. 2d 439
(1946) ; Bigger v. Unemp. Comp. Com., 43 Del. 274, 53 A. 2d 761 (1947) ; Bar-
clay White Co. v. Bd. of Rev., 356 Pa. 43, 50 A. 2d 336 (1947).
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the words in the statute, "as a condition of being so employed,"
refer to a condition in the offer of employment, as where the em-
ployer refuses to hire unless the individual resign from the union,
and not to a result flowing from the imposition of some union rule.
Organized labor naturally has a stake in this line of decisions but
its recourse would seem to lie with the legislatures. Such efforts
have been successful in at least two states17 where the words,
"acceptance of such employment," are substituted for "as a condi-
tion of being so employed."
The converse of the above situation also holds true in Ohio. A
refusal to accept work for the reason that such acceptance would
require claimant to join a labor union other than a company union
is grounds for disqualification.18
In many cases, an employee's health or physical condition com-
pels his refusal of certain types of work. Although most courts
and agencies consider the work unsuitable if it entails any danger
to the employee's health, 19 the Ohio courts, until recently, had been
requiring the claimant to be available for the work he had been do-
ing regardless of his physical condition. With the decision in Hinkle
v. Lennox Furnace Co.,20 which held that a refusal of one's former
work does not necessarily render the employee unavailable, Ohio
finally capitulated to what would seem the more logical view.
Perhaps the least litigated question in this field is that concern-
ing the eligibility of a claimant who rejects a referral for religious
reasons. The problem arose in Ohio when an applicant refused a
job which would require him to work on Saturdays, his Sabbath. 2'
The court, holding that such refusal rendered the claimant unavail-
able, rejected the contention that such construction of the law was
a violation of the constitutional right to religious freedom or the
right to equal protection of the laws. The determination of this
problem would seem a proper subject for the legislature, and at least
one state has so considered it. An Illinois statute provides that "An
individual shall be considered to be unavailable for work.., on days
which are holidays in his religion or faith .... " 2 2
The labor standards provision safeguards prevailing wage rates
by enjoining disqualification for refusal to accept employment if
17 MASS. ANN. LAWS, c, 151A §25 (c) (3) (1942); N.Y. LABOR LAW, §593
(2) (a) (1946).
"Ohio Bd. of Rev. Dec., 429-BR-48, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., f1965.24 (1948).
"Fannon v. Federal Cartridge Corp., 219 Minn. 306, 18 N.W. 2d 249
(1945); New York App. Bd. Case No. 11,501-44, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., § 35,556
(1945).
'H inkle v. Lennox Furnace Co., 150 Ohio St. 471, 83 N.E. 2d 521 (1948),
10 OHIo ST. L. J. 113 (1949).
Kut v. Albers Super Markets, Inc., 146 Ohio St. 522, 66 N.E. 2d 643
(1946); appeal dismissed, 329 U.S. 669 (1946).
-ILL. REV. STAT., Ch. 48, §222(c) (1945).
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the wages are below those prevailing for similar work in the
locality.23 However, there still exists the question as to whether a
claimant is justified in refusing employment the remuneration of
which is below that received in his prior employment. If the claim-
ant's unemployment has not been unduly extended and prospects
of obtaining work at his prior salary are reasonable, he does not
disqualify himself by refusing work at a substantially lower rate
of pay.24
Where an employee has been temporarily laid off and has good
prospects of returning to his regular job in a short time, other
employment of a permanent nature becomes unsuitable.25 A reason-
able policy in such situations would seem to be that expressed by
the Vermont Unemployment Compensation Commission: "If the
claimant has been temporarily laid off for a verified period of not
more than four weeks, he should be exposed to job openings, but
no offer of permanent employment will be considered as a referral
within the meaning of this policy.
'28
Unlike the statutes in most states, that in Ohio has no "suit-
ability" provision. The analagous section of the Ohio code renders
an applicant ineligible if he ". . has refused to accept an offer of
work for which he is reasonably fitted. . . ,,27 The Ohio Supreme
Court has said that the phrase, "reasonably fitted," refers to train-
ing and experience and not to whether the work is suitable as to
the individual.2 8 Although the personal circumstances of the claim-
ant are not entirely ignored by the Ohio Bureau of Unemployment
Compensation in determining whether a refusal of work is justified,
it would seem that such a course would not violate the provision as
so narrowly interpreted.
Such a construction of the law demonstrates the desirability
of the statutory enactment of a "suitability" provision as is con-
tained in a bill29 now pending in the Ohio Legislature. This bill
disqualifies any individual who has refused an offer of "suitable
See supra note 4.
Mich. App. Bd. Dec., Dkt. B4-2927-1627, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., 1965.912
(1945) ($1.45 to $1.20); Ohio Ref. Dec., 730-Ref-41, C.C.H., U.I. Serv.,
11965.35 (1941) ($32.00 a week to $19.50 a week).
'Berthiaume v. Christgau, 218 Minn. 65, 15 N.W. 2d 115- (1944); Ohio
Bd. of Rev. Dec., 514-BR-46, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., 1950.23 (1946).
- C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Treatise 11950 (1947).
- OHIO GEN. CODE §1345-6(d) (2) (1946).
' ". . . the Ohio statute requires the bureau to consider and determine
vhether the applicant is so qualified by training and experience for the work
offered and refused as to preclude unemployment benefits, rather than his
suitability or appropriateness for the work or the suitability of the work for
him as measured by his appraisal of it." Chambers v. Owens-Ames-Kimball
Co., 146 Ohio St. 559, 563, 67 N.E. 2d 439, 442 (1946).
-Amended S.B. 142 (1949).
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work" 30 and directs the Administrator, in determining whether
any work is suitable, to ". . . consider the degree of risk to the
claimant's health, safety, and morals, his physical fitness for the
work, his prior training and experience, his prior earnings, the
length of his unemployment, the distance of the available work
from his residence and his prospects for obtaining local work."31
What is suitable work for an individual must, of course, depend
on the particular facts, but, too often, it appears, a narrow legalistic
attitude destructive of the broad aims of the social security program
is adopted in applying the law to these facts. A fair interpretation
of the suitability provision, it would seem, should embrace the fol-
lowing principles: 1. Involuntary unemployment is to be given a
broad meaning. "The pressure of necessity, of legal duty, or family
obligations, or other overpowering circumstances and his capitula-
tion to them transform what is ostensibly voluntary unemployment
into involuntary unemployment. ' '32 2. Its interpretation is not to be
influenced by the effect it may have on an employer's merit rating.
As was said in a Connecticut case, "That the purpose of the act is
remedial in character is clear. It is therefore to be construed lib-
erally as regards beneficiaries, in order to accomplish its purpose." 33
-William R. Machuga
"Amended S.B. 142 § 1345-6(d) (2) (1949).
Amended S.B. 142 § 1345-6(f) (1949).
Bliley Electric Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 158
Pa. Super. 548, 557, 45 A. 2d 898, 903 (1945).
Waterbury Savings Bank v. Danaher, 128 Conn. 78, 82, 20 A. 2d 455, 458
(1940).
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